Edited by: Sanjay Kumar, Armed Forces Medical College, India
Reviewed by: M. Nazmul Hoque, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University, Bangladesh; Belen Prado, Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Ecuador
This article was submitted to Virology, a section of the journal Frontiers in Microbiology
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Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, postponed for the COVID-19 pandemic, were finally held in the summer of 2021. Just before the games, the Alpha variant was being replaced with the more contagious Delta variant. AY.4 substrain AY.29, which harbors two additional characteristic mutations of 5239C > T (NSP3 Y840Y) and 5514T > C (NSP3 V932A), emerged in Japan and became dominant in Tokyo by the time of the Olympic Games. Variants of SARS-CoV-2 genomes were performed to extract AY.29 Delta substrain samples with 5239C > T and 5514T > C. Phylogenetic analysis was performed to illustrate how AY.29 strains evolved and were introduced into countries abroad. Simultaneously, ancestral searches were performed for the overseas AY.29 samples to identify their origins in Japan using the maximum variant approach. As of January 10, 2022, 118 samples were identified in 20 countries. Phylogenetic analysis and ancestral searches identified 55 distinct introductions into those countries. The United States had 50 samples with 10 distinct introductions, and the United Kingdom had 13 distinct strains introduced in 18 samples. Other countries or regions with multiple introductions were Canada, Germany, South Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the Philippines. Among the 20 countries, most European and North American countries have vaccination rates over 50% and sufficient genomic surveillances are conducted; transmissions seem contained. However, propagation to unvaccinated regions might have caused unfathomable damages. Since samples in those unvaccinated countries are also undersampled with a longer lead time for data sharing, it will take longer to grasp the whole picture. More rigorous departure screenings for the participants from the unvaccinated countries might have been necessary.
香京julia种子在线播放
Long-awaited Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games were postponed for a year due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the overwhelming opposing Japanese public opinions, parties, including International Olympic Committee (IOC), International Paralympic Committee (IPC), the Japanese Government, and Tokyo Metropolitan Government, decided to hold the events in the summer of 2021, starting July 23 and August 24, respectively without spectators in the venues. They made efforts to reduce the number of visitors outside of Japan to minimize the risk of importing exogenous novel SARS-CoV-2 strains; as a result, it was substantially reduced to 54,250 from the pre-pandemic estimate of 180,000 (
Just before the Olympic Games began, in Japan, the Alpha variant [PANGO lineage (
Despite the 72-h testing requirement, Japanese airport quarantine stations identified 54 positive cases at the border control among overseas participants (
There have been two major concerns for the events regarding COVID-19 since athletes from 205 countries or regions compete in the events. First, Japanese citizens were afraid of novel exogenous strains will be introduced into the Japanese population by the participants from abroad, who are waived for any self-quarantine (
Impartial scientific evaluation of how mass gathering events, such as the size of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, affect cross-border transmissions must be conducted. In this study, we have analyzed the SARS-CoV-2 strains transmitted outside of Japan during the time of the Olympic and Paralympic Games.
To perform our analysis, 6,783,483 full genomes extracted from human subjects, were downloaded from the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) (
Variant annotation of SARS-CoV-2 genomes was performed as described in our previous report (
Variant Analysis of SARS-CoV-2 genomes sampled in Tokyo, Japan between July 1st and September 10, 2021. AY.29 Delta substrain is dominant in the period. Variants are colored depending on the type of mutations (missense, synonymous, non-coding, stop-gained, and frameshift). 3CLPro, 3C like protease; del, deletion; delins, deletion–insertion; E, envelope protein; ExoN, 3’-5’ exonuclease; M, membrane glycoprotein; N, nucleocapsid phosphoprotein; NA, not applicable; NSP, non-structural protein; OMT,
Phylogenetic analysis was carried out on all the AY.29 strains exported and randomly selected 1,000 AY.29 genomes from Japan. This selection consists of genomes with full collection date information and no unknown bases or gaps. We first aligned sequences using MAFFT version 7.475 (
Similarly, an ancestral strains search was performed for the overseas AY.29 samples using the maximum variant approach (
It is apparent that the Delta substrain AY.29, which harbors two characteristic mutations of 5239C > T (NSP3 Y840Y) and 5514T > C (NSP3 V932A) (
AY.29 evolved from AY.4 in Japan in April acquiring 5239C > T and 5514T > C mutations (EPI_ISL_2723567/EPI_ISL_2723568). The chronological order of emergences of 5239C > T and 5514T > C is not clear from the data. The ancestral AY.4 was an exogenous strain as seen in EPI_ISL_1927416, which is collected from a traveler from India at a Japanese airport quarantine in April; however, the actual introduction of the ancestral AY.4 strain might be earlier than April. In spike protein, besides D614G, L452R, T478K, P681R, and D950N, almost all AY.29 strains have T19R, T19I, G142D, and 156_158delinsG in N-terminal Domain (NTD). Among the substrains of AY.29, one with ORF8 P93S forms the largest group followed by one with spike Q173H, which is now classified as AY.29.1.
As of 10 January 2022, 118 of AY.29 exported samples were identified in 20 countries (
AY.29 strains identified outside of Japan.
Country | AY29 strains with collection dates and locations | Characteristic variants | Japanese AY.29 |
United States | EPI_ISL_3932831 (2021-07-23, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_3933098 (2021-07-28, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_3933071 (2021-07-29, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_3933081 (2021-08-02, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_3933062 (2021-08-05, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_3609214 (2021-08-09, California), EPI_ISL_4201347 (2021-08-10, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_4345621 (2021-08-13, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_4728273 (2021-08-13, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_4728362 (2021-08-13, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_4345610 (2021-08-20, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_4345585 (2021-08-21, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_4199055 (2021-08-23, Alaska), EPI_ISL_4728460 (2021-08-25, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_3943129 (2021-08-26, New York), EPI_ISL_4728404 (2021-08-31, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_5053721 (2021-09-06, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_5053784 (2021-09-08, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_5094157 (2021-09-26, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_5053755 (2021-09-04, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_5053763 (2021-09-06, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_6698696 (2021-09-07, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_7263984 (2021-09-16, Hawaii), EPI_ISL_6257008 (2021-10-13, North Dakota), EPI_ISL_5998608 (2021-10-26, North Dakota), EPI_ISL_5967340 (2021-10-27, North Dakota), EPI_ISL_6248505 (2021-11-05, North Carolina) | NSP3:P402T | EPI_ISL_3876536 (Tokyo) |
EPI_ISL_4176788 (2021-08-24, California), EPI_ISL_4176791 (2021-08-24, California), EPI_ISL_4176786 (2021-08-24, Mississippi), EPI_ISL_5084382 (2021-09-28, North Carolina), EPI_ISL_5230354 (2021-10-06, North Carolina), EPI_ISL_5230408 (2021-10-08, North Carolina), EPI_ISL_5238665 (2021-10-08, North Carolina), EPI_ISL_5084355 (2021-09-26, North Carolina) | ORF8:P93S, NSP3:N873D | EPI_ISL_4712063 (Okinawa) | |
EPI_ISL_4176784 (2021-08-24, New Hampshire) | ORF3:S272G, NSP3:N873D | EPI_ISL_4888720 (Okinawa/US base) | |
EPI_ISL_3749469 (2021-08-07, Ohio), EPI_ISL_3905086 (2021-08-23, Utah), EPI_ISL_3905136 (2021-08-23, Utah), EPI_ISL_3905142 (2021-08-23, Utah), EPI_ISL_3905301 (2021-08-23, Utah) | ORF8:P93S | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4761230 (2021-09-17, New York), EPI_ISL_4514414 (2021-09-14, New York) | ORF8:P93S, NSP2:T388I | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4910598 (2021-09-07, Missouri), EPI_ISL_4997950 (2021-09-13, Missouri), EPI_ISL_4545516 (2021-08-31, Minnesota) | ORF8:P93S, NSP16:T151I | EPI_ISL_3870758 (Ibaraki) | |
EPI_ISL_4183744 (2021-09-01, California) | ORF8:P93S, NSP2:S36N, Spike:G1099D | EPI_ISL_4759537 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4914318 (2021-09-02, Wisconsin) | Spike:H146Q | EPI_ISL_2723567 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4182356 (2021-08-28, California) | NSP12:T76I, NSP1:M85del, NSP3:A1537S, Spike:Q173H | EPI_ISL_4708043 (Saitama) | |
EPI_ISL_4812557 (2021-09-07, Illinois) | NSP3:I1413F, NSP3:N1284S, NSP3:V61I | EPI_ISL_3898844 (Tokyo) | |
United Kingdom | EPI_ISL_3573583 (2021-08-03, England), EPI_ISL_3883821 (2021-08-25, England) | ORF8:P93S, NSP13:I334V | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) |
EPI_ISL_3437719 (2021-08-10, England), EPI_ISL_3574088 (2021-08-11, England) | ORF8:P93S, NSP3:Y1185C, NSP5:A260V | EPI_ISL_4702802 (Saitama) | |
EPI_ISL_4531378 (2021-09-15, England), EPI_ISL_4531523 (2021-09-16, England) | ORF8:P93S, ORF7a:H73Y, NSP2:K67N | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_3775708 (2021-08-15, England) | ORF3:D22Y, NSP12:L638F, NSP13:Y541C | EPI_ISL_4698359 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4530565 (2021-09-23, England) | ORF8:P93S, NSP1:R24C, NSP3:N444S, N:D402Y, N:R41Q, Spike:L5F | EPI_ISL_3896031 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4530448 (2021-09-21, England) | ORF8:P93S, NSP14:A353T, N:T24N | EPI_ISL_4757664 (Shizuoka) | |
EPI_ISL_3471119 (2021-08-08, Scotland) | ORF8:P93S, NSP14:T372I, NSP2:A26V | EPI_ISL_3897760 (Japan) | |
EPI_ISL_3574055 (2021-08-12, England), EPI_ISL_5484052 (2021-10-16), EPI_ISL_5484738 (2021-10-16) | ORF8:P93S, NSP2:K67N | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_3528603 (2021-08-12, England) | ORF8:P93S, NSP6:Q208H | EPI_ISL_4696458 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4122814 (2021-09-07, England) | Spike:Q173H, Spike:S929I | EPI_ISL_3898182 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_3775517 (2021-08-19, England) | EPI_ISL_2723567 (Tokyo) | ||
EPI_ISL_3471038 (2021-08-09, Scotland) | EPI_ISL_3882891 (Chiba) | ||
EPI_ISL_3574052 (2021-08-12, England) | ORF8:P93S, ORF3:W128L, NSP3:G250V | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) | |
Canada | EPI_ISL_4409271 (2021-08, Ontario), EPI_ISL_4409465 (2021-08, Ontario), EPI_ISL_4409681 (2021-08, Ontario), EPI_ISL_4409854 (2021-08, Ontario) | NSP12:P227L, NSP3:S1682F, NSP3:T182I, N:S37P | EPI_ISL_3882454 (Tokyo) |
EPI_ISL_4221013 (2021-08-05, Quebec) | ORF8:A65V | EPI_ISL_3799899 (Kanagawa) | |
EPI_ISL_4432932 (2021-08-22, British Columbia) | ORF8:P93S, NSP14:D496Y, NSP2:T439A | EPI_ISL_4718461 (Osaka) | |
EPI_ISL_4001827 (2021-08, Ontario) | ORF8:P93S | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4433144 (2021-08-24, British Columbia) | EPI_ISL_3896646 (Tokyo) | ||
Germany | EPI_ISL_4610540 (2021-09-16, North Rhine-Westphalia), EPI_ISL_4610164 (2021-09-17, North Rhine-Westphalia), EPI_ISL_4616094 (2021-09-21, North Rhine-Westphalia), EPI_ISL_3886279 (2021-09-24, North Rhine-Westphalia) | NSP12:L638F | EPI_ISL_4698359 (Tokyo) |
EPI_ISL_5122077 (2021-09-21, North Rhine-Westphalia) | ORF8:S67F | EPI_ISL_4692148 (Chiba) | |
EPI_ISL_3878033 (2021-08-19, Berlin), EPI_ISL_4042783 (2021-08-26, Lower Saxony) | ORF8:P93S, NSP13:D204E, Spike:R408I, Spike:V622F | EPI_ISL_4719577 (Fukuoka) | |
South Korea | EPI_ISL_5924898 (2021-07-30) | NSP3:P402T | EPI_ISL_3876536 (Tokyo) |
EPI_ISL_5924900 (2021-08-10) | ORF3:T151I | EPI_ISL_4725150 (Okinawa) | |
EPI_ISL_3869693 (2021-08-14) | NSP15:T105I | EPI_ISL_2768526 (Kanagawa) | |
EPI_ISL_3869916 (2021-08-19) | EPI_ISL_2723567 (Tokyo) | ||
EPI_ISL_3869923 (2021-08-20) | ORF8:P93S, ORF3:D155Y, NSP13:A598V | EPI_ISL_3900316 (Tokyo) | |
EPI_ISL_4204297 (2021-08-31) | ORF8:A65V | EPI_ISL_4646073 (Hyogo) | |
Sweden | EPI_ISL_4535910 (2021-09-16, Stockholm), EPI_ISL_4867614 (2021-09-16, Vasternorrland) | ORF8:P93S, Spike:A846G, Spike:Q677H | EPI_ISL_3899038 (Tokyo) |
France | EPI_ISL_4283365 (2021-08-16, Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur) | ORF8:P93S | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) |
Australia | EPI_ISL_5033185 (2021-08-25, New South Wales) | ORF8:P93S, M:E167K, NSP16:A34V, NSP3:T350I, NSP4:K12R | EPI_ISL_4649671 (Kumamoto) |
Belgium | EPI_ISL_3800062 (2021-08-23, Limburg), EPI_ISL_4031107 (2021-08-31, Limburg) | ORF8:P93S, NSP4:S481L, NSP8:A18T | EPI_ISL_4759372 (Hyogo) |
Hong Kong | EPI_ISL_3219439 (2021-07-18) | ORF8:P93S | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) |
EPI_ISL_3547114 (2021-08-14) | ORF8:P93S | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) | |
Indonesia | EPI_ISL_5022763 (2021-09-11, West Java) | ORF8:P93S, NSP12:T26I, NSP4:T60I, NSP8:D101A | EPI_ISL_4641635 (Gifu) |
Italy | EPI_ISL_3399092 (2021-08-14) | NSP3:P402T, NSP16:H174R, NSP7:A80V | EPI_ISL_3882160 (Tokyo) |
New Zealand | EPI_ISL_3506222 (2021-08-10, Auckland), EPI_ISL_3506223 (2021-08-10, Auckland), EPI_ISL_3543461 (2021-08-17, Counties Manukau), EPI_ISL_3664424 (2021-08-19, Auckland), EPI_ISL_3543458 (2021-08-17, Auckland), EPI_ISL_3709130 (2021-08-21, Counties Manukau) | ORF8:P93S, Spike:T719I | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) |
Peru | EPI_ISL_4417371 (2021-08-19, Lima) | EPI_ISL_2768526 (Kanagawa) | |
Spain | EPI_ISL_4951307 (2021-09-17, Madrid) | ORF8:P93S, Spike:R158G | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) |
Thailand | EPI_ISL_5655524 (2021-08-22) | EPI_ISL_2768526 (Kanagawa) | |
EPI_ISL_6695529 (2021-09-27), EPI_ISL_6695527 (2021-09-29) | E:V62F, ORF3:L140F, ORF7a:P34S, NSP14:D345Y, NSP1:E148G | EPI_ISL_3882581 (Tokyo) | |
Philippines | EPI_ISL_5543733 (2021-07-28) | EPI_ISL_2768526 (Kanagawa) | |
EPI_ISL_5545908 (2021-08-07), EPI_ISL_5557098 (2021-08-10) | ORF8:P93S, NSP7:T45I, Spike:T778A | EPI_ISL_4666215 (Tokyo) | |
Israel | EPI_ISL_5620348 (2021-08-07) | ORF8:P93S, ORF8:A65T | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) |
Turkey | EPI_ISL_5331236 (2021-09-28) | ORF8:P93S, NSP12:G108V, NSP3:N1587D, NSP3:T199I | EPI_ISL_2723565 (Tokyo) |
Canary islands | EPI_ISL_6470526 (2021-09-09), EPI_ISL_6470525 (2021-09-13), EPI_ISL_6470512 (2021-09-15) | Spike:S1097L | EPI_ISL_4722362 (Tokyo) |
Phylogenetic analysis of AY.29 strains. All overseas samples were combined with randomly selected 1,000 AY.29 genomes in Japan. The exported strains of the two largest clusters in the AY.29 exported strains were labeled in green.
Although AY.29 strains have been identified outside of Japan, with limited knowledge, it is not certain how many of them were associated with Olympic and Paralympic cross-border travelers. Olympic and Paralympic-related travelers account for approximately one-third of the entire outbound travelers from Japan as implied in
The number of positive cases in Japan made a significant decrease from the peak in August as the vaccination rate in Japan increased. Although many breakthrough cases were reported due to the Delta variant (
List of Countries with vaccination rates lower than 10% on the August 1st otherwise noted, whose SARS-CoV-2 genomes have not been updated since the Olympic and Paralympic Games.
Country or region | Number of athletes | GISAID genome | Last sampled date | Fully vaccinated per 100 |
Afghanistan | 5 | 86 | 5/29/2021 | 1.08 (August 20) |
Algeria | 41 | 18 | 6/2/2021 | 1.62 (August 20) |
Angola | 20 | 108 | 7/19/2021 | 2.09 (August 3) |
Armenia | 17 | 82 | 3/18/2021 | 1.74 |
Benin | 7 | 133 | 7/23/2021 | 0.17 (August 3) |
Burkina Faso | 7 | 116 | 5/7/2021 | 0.06 (August 31) |
Burundi | 6 | 63 | 7/28/2021 | N/A |
Cape Verde | 6 | 0 | N/A | 3.86 (August 3) |
Central African Republic | 2 | 4 | 2021 | N/A |
Chad | 3 | 9 | 2021 | 0.04 (July 29) |
Comoros | 3 | 6 | 1/10/2021 | 4.66 (August 3) |
Cote d’Ivoire | 28 | 20 | 2/24/2021 | N/A |
Djibouti | 4 | 240 | 5/20/2021 | 1.89 (August 5) |
Eritrea | 13 | 0 | N/A | N/A |
Eswatini | 4 | 52 | 7/26/2021 | 2.36 (August 2) |
Ethiopia | 38 | 117 | 8/2/2021 | N/A |
Federated States of Micronesia | 3 | 0 | N/A | N/A |
Guinea | 5 | 59 | 7/7/2021 | 2.52 |
Guinea-Bissau | 4 | 8 | 2021 | 0.12 (August 9) |
Haiti | 6 | 72 | 8/7/2021 | 0 (August 2) |
Honduras | 27 | 89 | 7/31/2021 | 3.31 (August 3) |
Iraq | 4 | 140 | 7/28/2021 | 1.20 (July 11) |
Jamaica | 50 | 151 | 5/30/2021 | 4.45 (August 6) |
Kiribati | 3 | 0 | N/A | N/A |
Kyrgyzstan | 17 | 0 | N/A | 1.77 |
Lesotho | 2 | 18 | 1/18/2021 | 1.49 (August 25) |
Liberia | 3 | 77 | 7/10/2021 | N/A |
Libya | 4 | 84 | 3/3/2021 | 0.75 (August 18) |
Madagascar | 6 | 248 | 4/26/2021 | N/A |
Malawi | 5 | 41 | 7/5/2021 | 0.71 |
Marshall Islands | 2 | 0 | N/A | N/A |
Mauritania | 2 | 0 | N/A | 0.39 (August 3) |
Mozambique | 10 | 263 | 7/7/2021 | 1.00 (August 3) |
Namibia | 11 | 178 | 7/13/2021 | 1.91 |
Nicaragua | 8 | 0 | 2.95 (August 17) | |
Niger | 7 | 24 | 4/1/2021 | 0.13 (August 9) |
Palau | 3 | 0 | N/A | N/A |
Palestine | 5 | 95 | 4/9/2021 | N/A |
Sao Tome and Principe | 3 | 0 | N/A | 5.31 (August 3) |
Senegal | 9 | 224 | 6/1/2021 | 1.76 (August 3) |
Sierra Leone | 4 | 54 | 6/7/2021 | 0.41 (August 27) |
Solomon Islands | 3 | 5 | 3/26/2021 | 1.56 (August 2) |
Somalia | 2 | 18 | 4/6/2021 | 0.57 (August 21) |
South Sudan | 2 | 87 | 7/24/2021 | 0.04 (July 19) |
Sudan | 5 | 49 | 7/3/2021 | 0.41 (July 18) |
Syria | 6 | 0 | N/A | 0.05 (July 9) |
Tajikistan | 11 | 0 | N/A | 0.58 |
Tanzania | 3 | 0 | N/A | 0.17 (August 8) |
Togo | 4 | 248 | 7/31/2021 | 1.81 (August 3) |
Uganda | 25 | 595 | 8/9/2021 | 0.51 (August 20) |
Uzbekistan | 64 | 81 | 7/23/2021 | 3.63 (August 2) |
Vanuatu | 3 | 2 | 3/26/2021 | 0.04 (July 27) |
Venezuela | 44 | 46 | 7/7/2021 | 3.83 (July 12) |
Virgin Islands | 4 | 11 | 5/30/2021 | N/A |
Yemen | 5 | 0 | N/A | 0.04 (July 27) |
Zimbabwe | 5 | 112 | 7/25/2021 | 5.29 (August 2) |
Publicly available datasets were analyzed in this study. Data used in this study is available from GISAID and NCBI repositories.
TK conceived the idea, performed the research, analyzed the data, and wrote the manuscript. RT analyzed the data and wrote the manuscript. KK and AS supported the data analysis. MK and SI supervised the study. All authors interpreted the data, reviewed the manuscript, made refinements, and approved the submitted version.
TK, RT, and MK were employees of IBM. The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
We thank Teruhiko Yoshida for their technical assistance. We gratefully acknowledged the authors, originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences from GISAID’s EpiFlu
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: